Tuesday, January 28, 2020

The Vietnam And Somalia Syndrome History Essay

The Vietnam And Somalia Syndrome History Essay Defining humanitarian intervention has become fraught with ambiguities since it has most recently been a veneer in interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan ex post facto. As Reiff asserts Wars waged by developed countries all aspire on a certain level to humanitarian intervention  [1]  The use of humanitarianism justification as veil for national interests has clouded the terminology and sustained perceptions that humanitarianism is a vehicle of Imperialism.  [2]  In order to frame the analysis, Holzgreffe qualifies humanitarian intervention as The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens.  [3]  Although humanitarian intervention is rarely purely altruistic, the desire to address violations of human rights beyond national interests should be the driving force.  [4]   This analysis aims to explore the extent to which Vietnam and Somalia, two foreign policy interventions widely perceived as failures, have become synthesized into humanitarian intervention policy-making. As Robert Jervis argues, No intervention is discreet and separate; each instance changes the political landscape in which the actors operate.  [5]  Therefore the analysis will explore how these historical analogies interacted and informed policy-making consciousness. By evaluating the extent to which policy makers viewed humanitarian crises through the historical lens, it will examine how every decision is partly a response to past outcome.  [6]  The analysis will retrace political implications of Vietnam in the Carter and Reagan era, leading to examine if George H.W Bushs assertion that the Gulf War successfully kicked the Vietnam syndrome held truth. Furthermore, it will argue that failures in Somalia can be linked to Vietnam syndrome thus shaping foreign policy in Rwanda. It will argue that historical legacy of Vietnam and Somalia had three key repercussions for US humanitarian interventions: it questioned the global US role, it altered strategy by insisting on clear objectives and end goals and heightened the need for garnering public consensus. However, that historical factors cannot be viewed in isolation, a confluence of system level factors in the post-cold war period and individual factors also moulded episodes of humanitarian engagement. Owing to the limited scope of the essay, the analysis will focus upon key case studies up until the Clinton era, although this is by no means an exhaustive list of humanitarian interventions. The trope Vietnam has functioned as a metaphor for humiliation, exposing the limits of American power and capability on the international scene. Vietnam syndrome extended from a term to describe post traumatic stress experienced by veterans to encompass the political impact of the conflict on home soil, engendering a belief that the United States should avoid military intervention abroad  [7]  . Amid the rising causalities, the loss of public consensus raised questions about the US role in conflicts with limited national interest.  [8]   However, the way in which lessons from Vietnam were synthesized into foreign policy varied and often coalesced into different strategies. In his Notre Dame Speech Carter recognised the moral void left by Vietnam calling it: the best example of intellectual and moral poverty.  [9]  Across the left, Vietnam syndrome generally manifested itself in an aversion to military engagement fear in which the US would become bogged down in a similar quagmire. As a result, the Democratic majority in Congress enacted the 1973 War Powers Resolution, restricting the president from sending U.S. troops into combat for more than ninety days without congressional consent.  [10]  By reasserting congressional authority over foreign policy making, it aimed to avoid centralization of decisions in the hands of a presidency to prevent another Vietnam scenario.  [11]   Conversely, the failure of Vietnam was perceived largely across the right as self-inflicted owing to the absence of strong leadership and substantial force thus contributing to the post-war decline. Reagans revisionist interpretation of Vietnam attributed self-doubt to the failure in Vietnam: There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and determination to prevail.  [12]  Thus he aimed to restore the US role to its pre-war status quo and dispel the image of US decline on the world stage. Congressional refusal to authorise military intervention in Central America despite Reagans attempt to link humanitarian and national security interests, showed that Vietnam syndrome had trumped the Reagan Doctrine. The proxy war bolstering anti-communist allies and the reluctance to commit boots on the ground demonstrated that Vietnam had left a profound imprint on US strategy. In view of a potential Vietnam re-run in Central America, the Weinberger doctrine codified collective lessons from the Vietnam. It consisted of six tests to be used before the United States intervened including that vital interests must be at stake and congressional and public support must be obtained.  [13]  The clearest enunciation of military policy since Vietnam reflected how Vietnam syndrome had become integrated in US strategy, later informing the Powell doctrine.  [14]   Reagans successor George H. W Bush, was acutely aware of the constraints Vietnam syndrome placed on foreign policy as referenced in his inauguration speech The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can afford to be to be surrendered by memory.  [15]  Bush asserted that Vietnam was a case in point of how not to use military force, voicing particular criticism of Johnsons gradual escalation of firepower in Vietnam.  [16]   Bushs chance to exorcise Vietnam Syndrome came when Saddam Husseins military repression of Kurdish and Shiite uprisings prompted a mass exodus of refugees into Turkey and Iran. This was compounded by the closure of Turkeys borders, forcing thousands of Kurds to be trapped in the hostile mountain pass. Following international pressure, the US retracted its initial policy of non-intervention, founded on the fear it would make the U.S responsible for the government that emerged in Iraq.  [17]  Resolution 688 authorized military force to guarantee humanitarian organisations access to civilians in Iraq and was launched by declaring a no-fly zone and relief operation for the Kurds.  [18]   The intervention synthesized the lessons from Vietnam in two key ways. Firstly, the need to garner public support was met by Bush emphasising moral grounds, which were ambiguously delineated in Vietnam. Bush equated Saddam to Hitler revisited creating a good vs. evil frame through which public opinion could perceive the conflict.  [19]  He contended that I think the humanitarian concern; the refugee concern is so overwhelming that there will be a lot of understanding about this.  [20]  The moral impetus of the US role as an upholder of humanitarian values, coupled with the United Nations Security Councils resolution appended legitimacy to intervention serving to reinforce public support. Secondly, Vietnam syndrome had clear repercussions in Bushs strategy. The conditions for the use of force, stipulated in the Weinberg doctrine were becoming institutionalized with the Powell doctrine.  [21]  Ã‚  From an individual level of analysis Colin Powells beliefs sets were shaped by experiences as a Vietnam veteran , I was appalled[]fighting the war in Vietnam without ever pressing the political leaders to lay out clear objectives for them.  [22]  The Powell doctrine called for overwhelming force, once diplomatic means are exhausted, and a clearly defined exit strategy. The doctrines tenets are reflected in Operation Provide Comfort given the USs reluctance to persuade Turkey to meet its international humanitarian obligations and open its borders, grounded in the fear of being sucked into a civil war.  [23]  Bushs advisers warned that broadening a U.S. mission to finding a solution to Kurdish identity could become a protracted business, ceding to mission creep anal ogous with Vietnam. After the success of the Gulf war, Bush proclaimed: By God, weve kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all demonstrating the degree to which Vietnam had shaped foreign policy. Operation Provide Comfort had no doubt raised the nations confidence in its foreign policy and military leadership.  [24]  However Bushs eulogy of the syndrome was premature: the conduct of humanitarian intervention, emphasising air-power and avoiding mission creep complied with the Vietnam syndromes central canons of using maximum force with minimal casualties which effectively institutionalized the syndrome rather than kicking it.  [25]  Equally, the military success is more likely to have triumphed the Powell doctrine rather than exorcising Vietnam Syndrome and concerns with intervention abroad.  [26]  Informed by the lessons of Vietnam, the Powell Doctrine reinforced heavy reliance on fire-power, technology and a concrete exit strategy which blinded US policy makers to the complexity of the p olitical terrain in Somalia.  [27]   Clinton inherited the Somalia intervention from the Bushs administrations involvement in UNISOM I which monitored the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escorted deliveries of humanitarian supplies. Making a clear distinction between his democratic engagement policy, Clinton stressed that intervention in Somalia was purely humanitarian: The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of nation building.  [28]  However, the initial success was curtailed by the black-hawk down incident culminating in images of a dead US soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, rekindling the latent casualty aversion left by the Vietnam vestige. This was exacerbated by the belief that Somalia was a low-risk humanitarian intervention and by the CNN effect of real-time news reports eliciting a strong emotional response amongst public opinion.  [29]  Amid rapidly deteriorating public and congressional support for the mission, Clinton announced the end of U.S. involvement in Somalia. The Somalia syndrome is inherently linked to Vietnam Syndrome as alluded to in diplomat Richard Holbrookes coining of Vietmalia syndrome  [30]  . The Powell Doctrine, stemming from the lessons of Vietnam, locked the US into a realist mindset that overwhelming force would reap success in combat operations, shifting the focus away from non-state actors.  [31]  Equally, limited objectives tethered by the avoidance of mission creep prevented the mission expanding into a tougher approach to peace-keeping. These factors were incoherent with the deeply rooted political factors of the humanitarian crisis. Bushs assertion that Our mission was humanitarian [] we do not plan to dictate political outcomes  [32]  became untenable given that political reconstruction became intrinsic to humanitarian interests; this is evidenced when the purely humanitarian objective spiralled into pursuing a Somalia warlord. In their man-milieu hypothesis, Sprout and Sprout argue the context in which decision makers operate is formed by a variety of factors including history, culture and political institutions.  [33]  Clintons lack of military experience attracting criticisms of incompetence, his personal anti-Vietnam stance  [34]  and the republican majority in congress all interacted to shape the Somalia strategy.  [35]  The reluctance to commit troops to Somalia highlighted not only how the spectre of Vietnam permeated the policy remit but also that the historical analogy coalesced with individual and domestic factors. This supports the initial argument that Vietnam syndrome was present amongst a confluence of other factors influencing foreign policy. In the first framework of US peace-keeping role in the post- Cold War period, PDD 25 formally enshrined The Somalia Syndrome in US policy. It outlined specific criteria for US peacekeeping efforts and stipulated the US unwillingness to become involved in sub-national conflicts.  [36]  This precluded refusal to respond to the Rwandan genocide and supported the view that Somalia was a pivotal factor in influencing US policy making process.  [37]   The Somalia syndrome manifested itself in two key ways in US policy regarding Rwanda. Firstly, the public and political sphere viewed the unfolding violence misguidedly through the Somalia lens. As Klinghoffer sustains: The Somalia image of a failed state with random violence masked the actual premeditation and directing role of the Hutu extremists in the interim government.  [38]  This demonstrates that the historical proximity of the Rwandan genocide to Somalia became an analogical referent through which the events were seen in the frame work of a common African schema. That is to say, characteristics of the Rwandan genocide such as a failed-state and mass violence etc. were seen as synonymous with Somalia. Des Forges argues the hopeless imagery created by Somalia, legitimized the policy inaction.  [39]  In this line of thought, congressional and public opinion perceived a repeat of the Somalia imbroglio as unacceptable to future peacekeeping operations. Secondly, Washingto n became wary of peacekeeping missions undertaken by other countries fearing a costly U.S entanglement and crossing the Moghadishu line from peacekeeping to combat operations.  [40]  This underscored a retreat from assertive multilateralism to a limited US role in peacekeeping g operations. Non-intervention in Rwanda demonstrates that the Somalia syndrome had profound effects firstly in terms of defining the US role. As the sole superpower in the post-war era with leverage over United Nations, the unwillingness to demonstrate moral leadership in Rwanda restricted the parameters of US exceptionalism. Furthermore, policy makers responded to public casualty aversion in Somalia which consequently limited strategy options in Rwanda where national interests were not articulated.  [41]   Vietnam and Somalia have become increasingly institutionalized; ranging from the War powers act to PDD 25.  [42]  As outlined in the introduction, this has set a paradigm of redefining the US role in humanitarian interventions. By narrowing criteria for intervention, the Somalia Syndrome undermined the USs special role in New world Order envisioned by Bush.  [43]   Furthermore, the strategies which have evolved from lessons of Vietnam and Somalia have not be homogenous; Reagans proxy wars, the Powell doctrine and non-intervention in Rwanda demonstrate how the historical milieu has interacted with system and individual level factors thus generating key differences between Vietnam and Somalia syndromes. Following Vietnam, the US wanted to avoid the Soviet Union capitalising on US entanglement in a Third World conflict. Conversely, as the worlds sole superpower in the post Cold-war era, in the aftermath of Somalia Washington downplayed the threat posed by failing states with no national interests. This is supported by the man milieu theory which shows that Individual factors such Clintons lack of experience in foreign policy and Powells Vietnam experience have interacted with the lessons of Vietnam to formulate humanitarian intervention policy. Finally, public support became intrinsic to granting the moral legitimacy lacking from Vietnam. The polarization of public and congressional opinion constrained future presidential policy options and exemplified the need to link national interests with humanitarian crises. A significant drop in American tolerance for battlefield causalities no longer justifiable in the post Cold-War era by the struggle against communism, forced Clinton to retreat from an earlier multilateral humanitarian agenda.  [44]   Historical analogies continue to inform foreign policy. Parallels between Vietnam and Afghanistan in terms of protracted insurgency, public hostility and scepticism of a moral justification raise questions about the legacy of Afghanistan Syndrome on future humanitarian crises.

Monday, January 20, 2020

Away :: essays research papers

Away by Jane Urquhart is a complex novel that mixes romance, politics and family all in to one flowing story. It follows the lives of many different characters, but it is told through the memories of a woman named Esther. Esther attempts to sort through her great-grandmother's past, and her entire family's history. Away is a compelling novel that capture's the reader's attention in the first few pages. The beginning of the novel introduces the reader to Esther O'Malley Robertson as the last of a family of extreme women. She is sitting in her home, remembering a story that her grandmother told her a long time ago. Esther is the first character that the reader is introduced to, but we do not really understand who she is until the end of the story. Esther's main struggle is dealing with her home on Loughbreeze Beach being torn down, and trying to figure out the mysteries of her family's past. Mary is the next character that is introduced to the reader, and she is a very large part of the story. One day while Mary is at the beach a body washes up on the shore with many cabbages, kettles, and barrels of whiskey. She drags the body to the shore where she lies in the man's arms until he dies. This man was believed to have been from an "other world" and this had a big effect on Mary. She falls in love with this sailor, even though he is dead, and it casts a sort of spell on her. Mary is known to the rest of the village as "away" which means she is enchanted by this other world, the world of the sea. She felt as though her spirit were not in her humanly body anymore, and did not even consider herself Mary anymore. The spirits of the lake had given her a new name, Moira, and that is what she preferred to call herself. The villagers had no hope for, except for Father Quinn. As the priest on the island, Father Quinn feels he must bring Mary back to reality, but he finds it nearly impossible. He turns to his friend, Brian, who ends up convincing Mary to marry him. They have one child, Liam, and as famine and depression hit the island they live on, they are given the opportunity of a lifetime.

Sunday, January 12, 2020

My Unforgettable childhood events Essay

I have some bad while some good incident or occasions, which are never forgettable for me. For example, my circumstance after completing middle school graduation, which was good in one-way of thinking; however, it is bad in my way of thinking. Every person or family or country has some unforgettable occasion or events. For instance, America had the 9/11 incident, which is considered bad for USA. I was an average student when I was in Middle school and had so many dreams to fulfill after graduations such as to go for vacations, making fun with friends, etc., but there was someone who wanted to prove himself that he was enemy of my happiness. As I completed my middle school with good grades along with the age of 14, my dad came to me and said â€Å"I have a big surprise for you.† He said he got something, which would be helpful for me, along with studying in the High school. First of all, I became happy by thinking that he brought a new bike for me. However, that happiness was with me until he said what the surprise was. As soon as he told me about his surprise, I was really shocked and was not happy anymore, because he wanted me to help him in his business, which is a small printing press. I thought that I would make fun with my friends and enjoy my life fully when I completed my middle school and would go to the High school to get a higher education. I did not understand why he was trying to snatch my freedom, as I was expecting a good gift from him. I was not happy with my dad after knowing his intension for me. The reason for my unhappiness is that I did not go anywhere during my school days and did not know anything outside my county. I did not even visit out of state for enjoying vacation or for fun. Sometimes some theory or thinking has negative approach or has positive approach according to ones understanding. The same thing happened in my case. He was right according to his point of view. He was thinking about my future. He did not want me to just study, but he did like to introduce me to the outside economy and how to deal with people, which can only be learned by personal experience at a job place. After he told me why he was telling me to do a job, I realized that he was right. I also realized that he loves me a lot and takes care of me. He wanted me to get a good education with part time activities in the press company with him. Every parents feel proud depending on the success of their son/daughter. My dad loves me very much and also takes care of me. He always looks forward in bringing me up. He usually tells me about different good opportunities and also encourages me to join. If I do well in my study or any other matter, my dad feels that he himself gets success. He looks at his achievements by my achievements. He does not want to see his own head get down because of me. Every father has a dream that his son or daughter does well in every stage of life and gets much success. Even though my father did not do well during his young study age, he expects his children to do better than himself in the studies or job or any other position. If someone is a doctor or a pharmacist or at a high position in society then his/her parents feel proud by exposing his/her intelligence or his/her success in life. While on the other hand, sometimes parents might feel shame in front of others just because of their children. So, if I do something good, which people appreciate, my dad becomes happy and says â€Å"I am proud of you.† My dad want to me be a good educated man in society first, then I am free to enjoy anything. Therefore as soon as I completed my middle school, my dad told me to work with him, which I can say is a bad incident or occasion for me. However, when I understand that there is a big fact behind that, it would not be any bad incident or news for me. My dad explained me very politely that once I would be a good educated person in a society, then I would have a much time to enjoy life and do what ever I want, which I could not able to do during my school days. Thus because of only this circumstances, I can present my self as an independent person in society. That was considered almost a good change in my life. There are so many people who have either good occasion or bad one, but for me it has a dual nature depending on the way of thinking.

Saturday, January 4, 2020

National Security Requirements Exercised The Most...

National security requirements exercised the most significant influence on the development of airpower in Europe and the United States before the Second World War (WWII). Nations on both sides of the ocean had experienced the multifaceted disastrous results of World War I (WWI) and airpower seemed to be the answer for future wars. Understanding the context and consequences of WWI is vital to comprehend airpower theorists like Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard and their revolutionary thoughts on airpower. The development of aircraft at the beginning of the twentieth century challenged not only military leadership but also, more important, the national security of modern states. The basic question was: How will strategic bombing of enemy territory fit in to national security and military strategy? This paper will narrow the view on Europe by selecting Great Britain as one of the most relevant nations in WWII concerning strategic bombing. WWI was the first total war in the industrial age with unprecedented casualties on all sides of the belligerent nations. In spite of gigantic troop numbers, both sides expected a quick war with a decisive victory. However, in 1915, the maneuvering part of the war was over and resulted ultimately in bloody trench-warfare. Furthermore, as the war continued, attrition of the adversary became the main goal as the battle at Verdun highlighted. Consequently, aircraft offered an alternative to the static warfare of the trenches. These newlyShow MoreRelatedAccounting Developments in Poland6780 Words   |  28 Pagesexclave, to the north. The total area of Poland is 312,679 square kilometers (120,726 sq mi), making it the 69th largest country in the world and 9th in Europe. Poland has a population of over 38 million people, which makes it the 33rd most populous country in the world. 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